Institutions

Background

ARMCA was first created under Ordinance-Law No. 23/007 of 2023, which incorporated carbon markets into Congolese environmental law (Article 17 bis). Decree No. 23/22 of June 2023 further identified its mandates such as promoting carbon market participation, stewarding the national registry, implementing the carbon tax, and ensuring benefits to local communities (Article 4(1-14)). However, both texts were rushed through without the participation of Indigenous Peoples or local communities, and FPIC was absent from Ordinance-Law 23/007. Prior to the passage of the Loi Carbone, ARMCA’s mandate was unclear and at times overlapping with other ministries.^[4]

Under the Loi Carbone

With the passage of the Loi Carbone, ARMCA now regulates, authorizes, and supervises the registry, and imposes sanctions (Article 7), concentrating power in one body, since ARMCA also hears first-level appeals against its own decisions (Article 59).^[5] The customary-authority representative on the Inter-Ministerial Committee has no vote (Article 9).

Carbon Rights

The Loi Carbone defines some thirty technical terms but not “carbon right” or “rights holder” (Article 2). The State keeps sovereignty over natural resources, and the law cannot be read to harm rights recognized to communities (Article 4).

Under Ministerial Order 047, the State controls rights to all carbon, which are transferred to the project proponent upon approval. Because emission reductions lack physical form, carbon is not considered a ‘forest product’ in the DRC and the rights and obligations of such products do not extend to carbon. As such, carbon rights have essentially been created contract by contract between the State and the proponent. Communities negotiating implementation agreements should therefore ask to see the State-investor agreement on carbon rights and have it annexed to their agreement.

The Environmental Investigation Agency's 2016 comments on the Mai Ndombe ERPD argue that the ERPD assumes conservation concession holders can generate credits but other land users cannot.^[6] It is the opinion of SDSG, among others, that carbon rights should flow from legitimate land and forest tenure rights, even if these are not formally registered, in alignment with the FAO's VGGTs.^[7]

Benefit Sharing

Prior to the Loi Carbone, Law 22/030 (Article 47), Ministerial Order 011/27 (Article 13(1)(c)), and Ministerial Order 047 (Article 26) each addressed benefit sharing and communities were left vulnerable to one-off, contract-by-contract arrangements. Returning to the EIA’s review of the Mai Ndombe ERPD, the EIA argues that “the legal framework for carbon, as explained in the ER-PD, privileges government and project holders who hold contracts with government to commercialize carbon, and denies all others any legal basis for claims to carbon revenue, except through judicial claims of unjust enrichment”.^[8]

With the entry into force of the Loi Carbone, every revenue-generating activity that affects community rights requires a benefit-sharing agreement, and no authorization may be issued before ARMCA approves the benefit-sharing plan (Articles 25, 40). Communities receive at least 20% of net revenues effectively collected. This share cannot be reduced by overhead, financing costs, or intragroup charges, and any contrary clause is void. Developers must publish their annual volumes, prices, revenues, and distributions (Article 40).

Two limits are: The share is calculated on net, not gross, revenue. The list of prohibited deductions is not exhaustive.

How the remaining revenue is split will be set by an interministerial order (Article 40).

Key provisions and concerns

Benefit sharing runs throughout the Loi Carbone. Equitable sharing of benefits is a binding guiding principle (Article 13), and a Mitigation Activity Design Document (un Document de Conception de l’Activité d’Atténuation) must show compliance with the benefit-sharing rules (Article 21). FPIC is valid only if communities receive complete information on the proposed benefit sharing (Article 39). The benefit-sharing agreement must identify the beneficiaries, the calculation base, deductible expenses, each category’s share, payment deadlines, governance, audit procedures, and dispute resolution (Article 40). Failure to implement the plan is grounds for suspending or revoking the Letter of Authorization (Articles 29, 40). Any approved price must account for benefit sharing and the beneficiaries’ capacity to use the revenues (Article 51), and carbon revenue sharing applies only after existing community benefit obligations are honored (Annex III, section 6). Several concerns remain. The 20% net floor is lower than in other countries; Kenya, for instance, requires 40% of net profits. Because nature-based projects can take over a decade to become profitable, a net share may pay little for years, and stable payments that begin before profitability would better protect communities. The law sets no baseline for deductible costs, governance, audit, or dispute mechanisms, and does not require benefit-sharing agreements to be published. It also says developers “elaborate” the plan, which sits uneasily with negotiation under FPIC (Article 40). Finally, because most requirements are tied to the Letter of Authorization, it is unclear how they are enforced against projects trading only on the voluntary market.

Carbon and Land Governance in the DRC

The DRC's land tenure remains defined by its colonial history, with the State controlling all land and resources. The 2002 Forest Code established a framework for community-owned forests, elaborated by Decree 14/018 of 2014 (community concessions of up to 50,000 hectares) and Ministerial Order 025 of 2016. The application of these laws has been spotty,^[9] and abuses by customary leaders persist despite Article 21 of Ministerial Order 025 which prohibits customary leaders from claiming exclusive benefits from community forestry.

Logging companies are increasingly converting their logging concessions into conservation concessions; 36 of the 71 projects identified by RFUK fall into this category.^[10] It is not clear how oversight of conservation concession conversions is handled; in a 2023 Ministry of Environment review, 17 of 23 conservation concessions were former timber concessions that had been terminated or had received formal notice.^[11] In addition, 48 conservation concessions signed in 2017 were only published in 2026, which illustrates why Article 44’s publication deadline matters.^[12] We advise that a valid conservation concession be, at the very least, a condition precedent to any implementation agreement.

Theoretically, local community members – who are allocated the forests for a lifetime – hold a legal right to their land, so they can decide whether to join a REDD+ program and receive related payments.^[13] Law No. 25/045 of July 2025 further recognized customary tenure (Article 30), gave communities a right to FPIC (Article 90), and created dispute mechanisms (Title 3). The Loi Carbone, however, contains no clause stating that a carbon authorization confers no land title, and it does not require participatory mapping.

Grievance Mechanisms and Appeals

The Loi Carbone provides two channels for complaints. At the project level, the developer must establish, maintain, and fund an independent, accessible, culturally appropriate, and gender-sensitive grievance mechanism, and report complaints annually to ARMCA (Article 39). The mechanism must be free for complainants, recorded and traceable, and supervised by ARMCA (Annex III, section 4). Communities may also withdraw FPIC for substantial breach, which triggers suspension of the activity pending review (Article 39).

At the administrative level, anyone aggrieved by an ARMCA decision may file a written appeal with ARMCA within 30 days (Article 59). A further appeal may be made to the Minister of Environment within 15 days, to be decided within 45 days; it does not suspend the contested decision unless the Minister orders otherwise to prevent serious harm (Article 60). Courts may be called upon only after a party has undertaken both steps described above (Article 61).

These windows are short, and government silence counts as rejection, so advocates must time complaints carefully. It is also unclear how a developer-funded mechanism can operate independently. Civil society should monitor whether it genuinely resolves complaints rather than rubber-stamping them.

Gaps and Risks for Communities

Safeguard gaps

• The grievance mechanism is run and funded by the developer.
• There is no nullity clause for contracts that breach FPIC.
• The law does not stop the developer from choosing the community's adviser.
• The Red List bars activities only when FPIC is missing, if communities give FPIC then other potential harms do not result in a project being barred (Annex IV, Part C).

Transparency

The registry does not have to publish beneficial owners, land rights, FPIC documents, buyers, or complaints. Commercial confidentiality is also broadly protected.

Access to remedies

Appeals are open to "any other person" who is harmed, but communities have no express collective standing. Groups without legal personality may be turned away. No criminal offenses specifically protect communities.

Existing projects

Earlier authorizations remain valid, subject to a six-month compliance period, with no legal audit.

Implementing Regulations to watch

• Interministerial benefit-sharing order (Art. 40) provides an opportunity to limit the deductible expenses.
• IMC and CMC decrees (Articles 9-10) could give community representatives a vote.
• Confidentiality criteria (Art. 44) could exclude transaction totals from confidentiality.
• Accreditation of independent entities (Annex IX) provides an opportunity to rotate validators and let communities challenge them.
• Red List revisions (Annex IV) could exclude conversion of natural forests and areas with land conflicts.

Practical Checklist for Communities

Practical Checklist:

1. Confirm the project is approved and registered in the Registre Lumière.
2. Verify that the proponent's concession is valid.
3. Request the State-investor agreement on carbon rights.
4. Insist on independent legal and technical assistance.
5. Confirm that FPIC meets all six conditions.
6. Check that the benefit-sharing plan provides at least 20% and is approved by ARMCA.
7. Keep records for grievances and appeals.
8. For more comprehensive guidance, see these guides for NGOs and communities.

For more comprehensive guidance, see these guides for NGOs and communities.

Conclusion

Financing the protection of the Congo Basin's forests is incredibly important, and growing interest in the DRC's minerals is accelerating deforestation.^[14] The Loi Carbone is a step forward, adopting several long-standing civil society demands. However, the persistent lack of transparency, capacity constraints, corruption, and implementation gaps that have hindered otherwise strong forest and community provisions remain. Whether the new law delivers for customary tenure holders will depend largely on its implementing regulations.